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The Relevance of Benefit:
Competing Notions of
What Justice Requires 1
Gary Atkinson
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Prologue
One m ight have to think back as far as 1968 and the shootings of Martin
Luther King and Robert Kennedy to find a death which so gained the
attention and ire of the nation as that of a nameless male infant in
Bloomington, I ndiana. The child died April 15, 1982 as a result of a
decision by parents and phys ician not to remove an obstruction in his
esophagus blocking food from entering his stomach . Although the
blockage could have been corrected by relatively simple surgery, the
procedure was not performed because the infant was believed afflicted
with Down's syndrome. The child lived six days without food or Ouids,
and died before an appeal could reach the United States Supreme Court.
alleging that the refusal of treatment represented a denia P of the infant's
constitutional right of due process. The evidence indicated that the infant
almost certainly did have Down's syndrome. But chromosome studies , the
only means of being absolutely certa in of the diagnosis, were not done.
Apparently in response to the controversy surrounding this infant's
death, the Office for Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human
Services (H H S) issued May 18, 1982 a "N otice to Health Care Providers."
The "Notice" warned that it was a violation of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to withhold food or medical treatment from a
handicapped in fant if "( I) the withholding is based on the fact that the
infant is handicapped; and (2) the handicap does not render the treatment
or nutritional sustenance medically contraindicated." The relevant part of
Section 504 states that "no otherwise qualified handicapped individual ....
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be su bjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." The "Notice"
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warned that failure to respect 504 cou ld result in loss of federal funds for
the offending institution.
On March 7.1983 the Office of the Secretary of H HS issued an " Interim
Fi nal Rule" wh ich ca me to be known as the" Ba by Doe Rule" ow ing to its
perceived connection with the Bloomington "Infant Doe" case . The
purpose of the" Rule" was to add to regulations implementing Section 504:
(I) the protections afforded handicapped infants were to be brought to th e
attention of hea lth professionals and others who would be likel y to know
of the occurrence of possible vio lations : (2) speedier in vestigation of
alleged vio lations was provided for . since the requirement of a 10-day
waiting period in the 1973 Act would often preclude action in time to save
the lives of infants being discriminatorily withheld from treatment; and
(3) round-the-clock access to hospital records to assure compliance was
required.
Since the stated ultimate purpose of the "Interim Final Rule" was to
sa ve the li ves of handicapped infants . and since the Secretary believed that
those who had knowledge of violation of Section 504 might lack
opportunit y to provide immediat e notice to federal officials. the "Ru le'
required that a notice be posted in delivery. maternity. and pediatric wards
giving the relevant information regarding Section 504 and declaring that
"discriminatory failure to feed and care for handicapped infant s in this
facility is prohibited by federal law." The notice also was to list the number
of what came to be called the "Baby Doe Hotline," a toll-free number open
24 hours a day where HHS could be reached by anyone "having
knowledge that a handicapped infant is being discriminatorily denied food
or customary medical care."
The "Interim Final Rule" took effect March 22, 1983. It received wide
attention and vehement criticism. particularly from the medical
profession. Suit was brought in federal court to block implementation of
the rule. and a stay was issued April 22. In response to t~e opposition from
the medical profession , the Secretary issued, on July 5.1983. a new set of
"Proposed Rules." Instead of setting a date on which the rules were to be
implemented. the document merely specified that comments on th e
proposal be submitted by September 8. The "Proposed Rules," contained
the major points of the "Interim Final Rule," but added the requirement
that state child protective agencies be involved to assure greater
compliance with state laws prohibiting child abuse and neglect.
On Jan. 12. 1984, the Secretary of H HS issued its "Final Rule" to take
effect Feb. 13. As a result of nearly 17,000 comments submitted in response
to the "Proposed Rules." a few changes were made regarding the required
notice and certain enforcement procedures. Also, greater attention was
given to the possible usefulness of Infant Care Review Committees in
developing appropriate standards and in making decisions about specific
cases. But the fundamental principles embodied in the "Interim Final
Rule" and the "Proposed Rules" remained unchanged.
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This paper exa min es th e H HS doc um en ts in o rd er to e x pli cate the
Reagan administration's understanding of the re4uirements of just ice for
the defective newborn. Although the guidelines ma y, in fact. be th e best
means available for assuri ng that justice is done, it will be argued that the
underlying eth ica l principlcs arc inade4uate in failing to take acco unt of
morally re le vant conside rations that are defensible in justice and
sanc ti o ned by t he C hu rch's offic ia l teachings.

What Justice Requires
This pape r assumes, w ith o ut argume nt. th a t newborns fall wit hin the
scope of jus ti ce a nd th a t th e age ofa born hum an be in g is by itself no more
m o ra ll y relevant than race, sex, IQ, or physical strength or beauty.2lfthis
pos it ion be granted. then it ma y seem ob vious that a serious inju sti ce was
done in Bloomington. T hi s paper argues for that view. But let us begin by
co ns id c rin g how one might. w hil e admitting th a t infa nts fa ll w ithin th e
scope of justice, offe r o ne of two dcfenses for th e way Infant Doe was
treated.
First. one cou ld appeal to what ma y be ca lled an "absolute 4ual it y-ofli fe" sta ndard , holding th at th ere are certain lives so low in 4uality that th e
person wo uld be be tt e r offdead , and that one might be doing him an ac tual
injustice b y a ll owing him to li ve ( i.e .. the asse rtion underl yin g "wrongful
li fe" suits). T hen o ne would have to c laim th a t a person w ith Down's
Synd rome meets whatever cond iti o ns t here a re for possess i ng s uc h a
" negat ive 4uality o f life."
Set as id e th e objec ti on that no co nfirmi ng tests were undertaken to
ve rify the diagnosis of Down's sy ndr o m e in the case of Baby Doe . Set
a s id e. t oo, the po int th a t Down's syndrome displays considerable
var iation in it s ex press ion fr om severe re tardati on to bord erline normal.
w ith the vas t majority falling in th e range of moderate retarda ti on. There
rema in t wo genera l o bj ec ti o ns to s uc h an approach.
,
T he re is one serious objection w hich ca n be brought aga in st anI"
absolut e 4ualit y-of- life standard: th e re is, in fa ct. no con se ns us a b ou t what
makes a life not worth li vin g . Thejudgment th a t a give n indi vidua l's life is
not wo rth li vin g is subjective a nd idiosyncratic in the extreme. It is a
judgment that cou ld be called "ideo logica l" in ex press ing a particular
conv ict ion regarding the meaning of human existe nce. What o ne person
finds tolerab le another finds int o le ra ble. Seco nd , e mpirica l studies of
indi viduals actu a ll y afnicted with Down's sy ndr o me show that th ey do not
share th e view th a t life w ith th at condition is no t worth living.
Thus, what appeals to an absolute quality-of-life standard comes to in
thi s case is a position favo rin g th e kil lin g of a no n-con se ntin g hum a n being
b y a second pe rso n usin g a 4u a lit y-of-life sta ndard th e victim him se lf
would be unlik e ly to sha re. If we examine what justice requires for a
mom e nt from a Kantian pe rs pec ti ve and if we were to conduct the thought
ex pe riment of d es igning rule s for a soc iet y in which we are to be born and
li ve, we would ce rt a inl y no t a d o pt a rule pe rmitting such ki lling. The
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adoption of this rule will be seen to be even more unjustifiable when we
reflect on the possibility that the person making such negative quality-oflife judgments for the helpless individual might be in the position of being
required to care for him if he is not killed. For example . the parent who
uses an absolute quality-of-life standard to judge his chi ld 's life not worth
living is precisely the one who would incur the cost and other burdens of
care if the child does not die. The possibilities for bias and gross abuse are
manifest.
An alternative defense of t he Bloomington case would be to admit this
serious moral objection to the use of any absolute quality-of-life standard.
at least when it is imposed on someone who has not already expressed his
views . Still, one could maintain that the objection is considerably lessened
when appeal is made to a "relative quality-of-life" standard. The point of
such a standard is simply to make explicit what we all recognize: that
physical and mental normalcy is preferable to physical impairment of
mental retardation, that it is better to walk on two legs than to get around
in a wheelchair, better to have the mental capacity to read a book than not
to have it. The reason why from a Kantian perspective the use of such a
standard is not unjust is that it is one to which, within rough limits, we all
can agree.
What follows from the use of a relative quality-of-life standard is the
conviction that we benefit a person more by restoring him to normal health
and functioning than if we leave him in a more or less seriously impaired
condition . This must be distinguished from the view that we do the person
no good at all. That would be a judgment expressive of an absolute
quality-of-life standard. It is one thing to say that a mentally defective
individual has a low quality of life. It is quite another to suggest that the
individual's quality of life is zero or negative. For instance, using a relative
quality-of-life standard , we would have to say about Karen Ann Quinlan
that her quality of life was low and that we were doinll her relatively little
good in keeping her alive . But , since Karen herself did not te ll us, we could
not say that we were doing her absolutely no good at all. The issue here is
not the truth of these judgments but the justice of acting on them when
their acceptance by the party most involved is in doubt.

One Step to Complete Defense
Now there remains one more step to complete the second defense of the
non-treatment of the Bloomington Baby. This is the principle that the help
we are required to render in justice normally depends on four features: (I)
the significance of the good that can reasonably be expected ; (2) the degree
of harm caused by the rendering of aid for the person being thus "aided";
(3) the degree of burden that must be assumed by those providing aid; and
(4) the nature of the relationships among the parties. For instance , justice
may require us to stop and render aid to someone involved in a serious
accident , but we would not be required in justice to help him change a flat
tire. A surgeon may be required to operate on a patient, but not if there is
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no anesthetic a va ilable. Although we ma y not ha ve a dut y inju stice to save
a strange r's life at the ri sk of our own, we might ha ve one if the only cost of
d o ing so is th a t of being late for a n appointment. And we would bla me a
pa rent who refuses to pay the cost of educating his child , though we would
not blame a stranger for refusing.
Use of relative quality-of-life stand a rd also is sanctioned by
authoritative Church teachings . Pope Pi us X II's famou s 1957 statement
on the "Prolongation of Life" makes it clear that the Christian duty to
preserve life depends on the context:
But no rma lly o ne is held to use o nly ord ina ry mea ns - acco rdin g to
circ umsta nces of perso ns. pl aces. t imes a nd c ulture - tha t is to say. mea ns
th a t d o no t in vo lve a ny g rave burd en fo r o nese lf or a no th er. A more stri ct
o bli gati o n wo uld be t oo burden so me for m os t me n a nd would re nde r th e
att a inme nt o f the hig he r. more important go o d too diffic ult . Life. hea lth . a ll
te mpora l acti vit ies a re in fac t sub o rdina ted to spiri tua l e nds'"

The idea of not being obliged to a ss ume a "gra ve burden" in prolonging
life receives ex pansion in the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Fa ith's 1980 "Declaration on Euthanasia." Instead of employing the
phrase " ordinary means" to refer to obligatory therapies, the "Declaration"
focu ses on the distinction between "proportionate" a nd "disproportionate" means:
It will be poss ibl e to ma ke a co rrec t j ud g men t as to the mea ns by st ud ying th e
type of trea tme nt used . it s degree of co mpl ex it y o r ri sk. its cost a nd th e
poss ibi liti es o f using it . a nd co mpa ring these eleme nt s with the res ult t ha t ca n
be ex pec ted . tak ing into acco unt th e sta te of th e sick pe rso n a nd hi s o r her
ph ys ical a nd m o ral resources.
It is a lso permi ss ible to ma ke do with the no rmal means that medicine ca n
offer. The refo re o ne ca nn o t imp ose o n a nyone the obliga ti o n to have reco urse
to a technique which is a lread y in use but which ca rries a ri sk o r is
burdenso me . Such should be co nsid e red as a n acce ptan ce of the human
co ndition . or a wi sh to avoid the a pplica tion o f a m edic a~ procedure
di spro portion a te to th e result s th a t ca n be e x pected . o r a d es ire no t to impo se
excessive ex pense on the famil y o r co mmunity·

The language of "means that do not involve an y grave burden for oneself
or another" in the 1957 statement becomes "a medical procedure
disproportionate to the results that can be expected" in the 1980
document. But three points seem clear in both statements: (I) that
decisions regarding the obligatoriness of certain treatments are contextdependent; (2) that the burdens imposed on others of providing treatment
may legitimately be taken into consideration; and (3) that the degree of
expected benefit to the patient is another morally relevant consideration .
The Church's official teaching is perfectly consistent with secular notions
of justice in this regard.
Thus , on both secular theories of justice and historical Catholic
principles , the obligation one has to preserve another's life is relative to a
proportion between the benefits expected and the burdens imposed . And if
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appeal to proportional benefit can indeed be justified, then a defense of
letting Infant Doe die could be offered as follows. A rejection of an
absolute 4uality of life standard prevents us from saying that we harm
Infant Doe by letting him li ve. But we can say that we will do him less good
by preserving his life than by preserving the life of a completely normal
child. If we join with th is the point that caring for a child with Down's
synd ro me ca n be pa rt ieula rly onerous bot h for pa rents a nd society, we ca n
see how one might claim that the ratio of benefit to cost is too low to
ma ndate treatment. Society clea rly has no obligation to spend $ I 0,000,000
to restore a human being to normal functioning. Nor do we as a society
have the responsibility to expend the effort necessary to raise a child with
Down's syndrome.
It bears noting that this argument about what is required injustice is not
necessarily utilitarian. It is not even necessarily consequentialist. if that
term be taken to refer to the thesis that consequences alone matter. This
argument does not maintain that allowing the child to die is justified
because overall social utility will be thereby maximized. Nor is it argued
that the benefit to society is too small to justify the expenditures. Rather,
the claim is that the expected benefit to the child himself is too small
relative to the cost to require treatment. I f one rejects the propriety of this line
of reasoning, it will be difficult if not impossible to escape the conclus ion
that just ice does indeed require the spend ing of $1 0,000,000 to save a life .
The major defect with the argument in this case is not its form or the
moral relevance of the considerations it advances, but s impl y the
pIa usibility of its principal premise, that the expected benefit to the child is
too low. given the burden of care, to require treatment. Caring for a child
with Down's syndrome is no doubt more difficult than for the average
ch ild, but how many physically and mentally normal children for a
number of reasons impose a burden on their parents and society equal to
or greater than that posed by children with Down's syndrome? And as for
benefit. individ uals with Down's syndrome seem to value their own li ves as
much as normal people value theirs.
I f it be 0 bjected t ha t such i nd ivid uals a re mentally too deficient to make
correct judgments in this area, we might well ask how that assertion could
be defended. And we might note the many serious ly physically
handicapped persons who find great value in their lives. A Christia n will
recognize the defective child as the object of God's enduring love. And
even from a secu lar viewpoint, a spirit of tolerance, while recognizing the
desirability of physical and mental normalcy, will not be quick to denigrate
the goodness of persons' lives, especially when their possessors find them
good. And finally, from a Kantian perspective, it simply does not appear
credible that an individual who sets aside his own idiosyncratic va lues
should choose for a society in whic h he was to be born and live, a policy
that would a ll ow infants with Down's syndrome to die at the wishes of
their parents. An adu lt with a full formed set of idiosyncratic values might
very well honestly say, "If I were an infant with Down's syndrome I would
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not want to li ve ." but justice cannot permit th e imposition of s uch va lues
o n ano th er person.

The " Bab y Doe" Guidelines: What Justice Does Not Require
The la nguage of a ll the H H S documents is th e la ng uage of
nond iscrimin a ti o n. The "Proposed Rules" are filled w ith s uch refere nces.
For ins ta nce. th ere is niention of the need for "exped iti ous investigation
a nd immedi a te e nfo rceme nt ac ti o n when necessary to protect a
ha ndi ca pped infant w ho se life is endange red b y discrimination."5 Th e
d oc u m e nt decla res th a t th e "d isc ri m i na tory fa i Iure of hea It h ca re providers
to feed a handi cap ped infant or to provide m edica l treatmen t esse ntial t o
co rrec t a life-threa tening co nditi o n" is a vio la ti o n o f Section 504 o f th e
Rehabilitation Act w hi ch "requires that hea lth se rvices be prov ided to th e
ha ndi cap ped o n a bas is o f equalit y with th ose not ha ndi ca pped' ".
T he ke y to th e R eaga n ad mini strat ion's pos iti o n a nd a n indicat io n of
whe re it s weak ness lies ca n be found in this paragraph :
Section 504 is in essence

al1

clJual treatment. nondiscr imin ation st"l ndard .

Congress patterned Section 504 on T itle V I of th e C i"il Right s Aet. ,,"hi eh
prohibits discrimination based on ra ce. Programs or activities rece iving fede ra l
fina ncial ass ista nce ma y not deny a hCl1cfil o r sen'icc so lely o n grounds of a

r c rso n's handi cap.ju st as t hey ma y not deny a hCJ1cfit or se n "icc

O il

grou nd s o f

a person's race, l,

This a na logy betwee n the handi cap pe d pe rso n a nd th e pe rs on
discriminated against on th e basi s of ra ce is revealing . If we think racial
di scrim inati o n wrong. it is because we assume e ith e r (I) that the service
be ing denied members of th e di sfavored rac e would be a t leas t ro ughl y as
be neficia l to them as it is to th e perso ns rece iving th e service o r (2) that
th e re ex ists a n alternative se rv ice which would be as va luabl e. And we also
think thi s discriminatory be ha v io r wro ng partl y beca use it results fr o m a
spirit of hat e or ca llou s indiffere nce towards th e di s fav~'e d race rather
th a n for so m e m o ra ll y defensible reaso n. The co ntention that a se rvice
d e nied members of one race wo uld not ben efi t th e m and ca nn o t be
substituted fo r b y an a ltern a ti ve service wo uld . if true . be a n effective
res ponse t o an y charge of racia l di scriminat io n. Thus . if a n analogy
between racial discrimination and the w ithh o lding of ca re for han d ica pped
infants is to be s usta ined . it will need to be s hown (I) that th e re exists at
least so m e be neficia l se rvice being d e ni ed ha ndica pped infants and (2) that
d e nial of the se rvice has no mora ll y defensible ex pla nati o n.
The hi story of judicia I int er preta tion of Secti o n 504 s hows a n awa reness
of the first point. That sec tion contained refe re nce to an "o th e rwis e
qu a lifi ed ha ndica pped indi vidua l" without a n ex pl a nat ion of th e
s ig nifica nce o f the phrase "otherwise qualified." A 1979 S upre m e Co urt
d ecis ion cla rifi ed thi s lang ua ge by d ecla rin g s uch a perso n to be o ne
capable of be nefitting. in spite of his ha ndi ca p. from th e prog ram offered .
The iss ue. th e n . as Section 504 is a ppli ed to th e care of ha ndicap ped
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infants. is which infants are "otherwise qualified." i.e .. are capable of
benefitting from the services being offered to others. but denied the m .
The position of the Reagan administration on this point is clear. The
"Final Rule" states:
In the co nt ext of recei"ing medical care. the ahility to henefit for a
handicapped person is the ahility to hencfit medically from the treatment or
sen'ices. If thc handicapped person is ahlc to hencfit medi ca ll y from the
t rea t me nt or sen'ice. in s pite of t he person's presc nt or ant ici pol ted p hysica I or
men tal impairments. the indi,'idua l is "otherwi se qualified " to rcce iyc that
treatment or sen'ice. and it may not he denicd solely on the has is of the
handicap .
Th e refore. the analytical framc\\'ork undcr the sta tutc for applying sect ion
S04 in the con tc xt of health care for handicapped infants is that health ca re
prm'idcrs may not. solei,' on the hasis of prese nt or anticipated physical or
mental impairme nts of an infant. withhold trea tment or nourishment from the
in fant who. in s pit c of such impairments. will medically hcncfit from the
treatment o r nouri shmcnt. 7

This does not mean. though . that handicapped infants must be given all
treatments that would ordinarily be provided normal children:
These interpretati ve guidelines make clear that
futile treatments or
treatmcnts that will do no more than temporaril y prolong the act of dying of a
terminally ill infant are not required hy sec tion S04. and that. in determining
w hether certain possihle trea tments will he medicall y he neficial to an infant.
reasonahle medical judgments in selecting a mong alternative courses of
treatment will he respected .'

Although it would be permissible. for example. not to engage in surgery
to prolong the life of an anencephalic infant who will die soon. whatever is
done. treatment may not be withheld because of cost ("cost should not be a
determinative factor in deciding upon treatment for seriously impaired
newborns")9 or because of the burden of care imposed on the family
("excluding consideration of the negative effects of an impaired child's life
on other persons' ").10
,
Now there is much that is right with the position of the Reagan
administration. I n spite of some self-serving statements from the medical
profession. there does exist a significant bias against handicapped infants
which renders them victims of unjust undertreatment. It is possible to
disagree about the frequency of such occurrence. But how many of those
who contend that the prob lem is minor would be content with the remark
that political oppression in America n society constitutes a minor problem
beca use there are so few genuinely political prisoners in our jails? The very
legitimacy of the American system rests upon its concern for justice/or al/.
And although there are limits to what any human institution can be
expected to accomplish, we cannot afford to take lightly any institutional
injustice - injustice which is perpetrated through our institutions rather
than in spite of them.
But there is a weakness, too, in the Administration's position, one
suggested by the analogy drawn with racial injustice. We assume that
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providing second-rate schools for blacks is wrong because we believe not
only that they could benefit from better schools but also that not providing
better schools results from racist attitudes. In other words . we oppose
second-rate schools for blacks as unjust because we think that there is no
morally defensible reason for not providing better ones.
The Reagan administration's position comes close to the suggestion that
there is 110 morall y defensible reason for withholding from the
handicapped infant medically beneficial treatment which would ordinarily
be given to the normal child. But it would seem that the assumption ought
to be that whatever considerations are deemed legitimate within a general
theory of justice arc also defensible IIll/talis II/walldis when dealing with
the care of infants. defective or normal. Consider once again the four
reasons cited above with possible applications to pediatric medicine: (I) no
benefit at all can reasonably be expected from the proposed therapy (e.g.,
the infant will die soon whateve r is done) : (2) the benefit is too low to
justify the harm done (e.g .. a Tay-Saehs child requires cardiac surgery): (3)
the cost of rendering aid is too heavy to require its imposition (e.g .. the
child needs a liver transplant in order to live): and (4) the relationship
among the parties does not impose a given duty (e.g .. an overworked
surgeon refuses to perform an operation on an infant not his patient) .
These arc legitimate considerations within a general theory of justice, and
though they no doubt create special problems in the practice of pediatric
medicine . this is no reason for thinking them inappropriate or unjust.
Surely the burdcn or proor ought to be on those who admit the general
moral rclevanec ' of these considerations but deny their acceptability in
determining the ethically mandated care or the defective child.
It may be objected that no one is upset over decisions not to engage in
cardiac surgery for a child with Tay-Saehs or not to seek a liver transplant
ror an anenccphalie infant. What is bothersome because unjust, are
decisions likc thc one in Bloomington. to withhold simple surgery for
children with Down's syndrome. But ir one examines the cases which
act ually generate the greatest moral uncertainty as opposed to controversy
(egregiously wrongful acts are orten highly controversial), one rinds that
such cases are not instances of withholding food and fluids from children
with Down's syndrome. The cases which create the most moral uncertainty
are precisely ones in which there exist general moral considerations favoring
discontinuance of treatment. but for which the H HS guidelines would
seem to mandate continued therapy.

A Case
To illustrate the point that the Reagan administration's requirements
may conflict with general considerations of justice, consider the following
true case. one which is unfortunately not atypical.
An infant (let us call him Robert) was admitted to a neonatal intensive
care unit (NICU) shortly after birth. He weighed 960 gramsat birth, with a
heart rate. respiration . and blood pressure of zero and a body temperature
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of 93 degrees. He was diagnosed as ha ving perinatal asphyxia for an
undetermined length of time. Robert has been at the N ICU for more than
three months . During that time he has experienced recurrent periods of
slow heartbeat (bradycardia) and loss of spontaneous breathing (apnea).
He has been placed on and taken off a respirator severa l times. Robert ha s
a bulging fontanelle and was diagnosed as hav ing had an intracranial
hemorrhage . A CT-scan and an EEG have revealed some abnormalities.
Robert neither sucks nor swallows. In the middle of the fourth month after
birth , a neurological examination shows probability of "significa nt
neurological involvement." The best the neurologist is willing to haza rd
for Robert is that he will be of low normal intelligence. The child has had
seizures and was placed on phenobarbital until it was discontinued when
the doses became toxic. Use of the respirator has damaged the child's lungs,
and there is some fear that continued use of the tube through which he is
fed will cause constriction of the trachea. Robert has contractures which
make a neurological examination difficult. He has developed scurvy and
rickets. The neurological examination suggested that the child might grow
out of his apnea and bradycardia. The seizures appear likely to continue
but may be partially controllable. None of the attending professionals
believe Robert is dying, though his overall prognosis is "very poor." His
mother seems willing to take Robert into her home, but she is young and
unmarried a nd lives with her mother in a house with no running water,
phone or electricity. A phone is available at the home of relatives, about
one mile away. They have a car, but it is unreliable. The social worker on
Robert's case doubts whether the mother will be able to provide the
medical care that would become necessary in an emergency.
The H HS guidelines maintain it to be a violation of Section 504 for a
recipient of federal funds
to withho ld from a handicapped infant nutritional sustenance or medical or
surgical treatment required to correct a life-threate ning co nliition if:
(I) the withholding is based on the fact that th e infant is handicapped ; and
(2) the handicap does not render the treatment or nutritional sustenance
medicall y co ntraindicated. "

If Robert develops apnea while he is off the respirator, should we place him
back on? Do we have a legal or moral duty to do so?
We may begin to answer these questions by examining them from the
point of view of the Reagan administration. We would first need to know
whether Robert counts as an "otherwise qualified handicapped infant." It
would be most implausible to suggest that he does not. Robert is not dying,
though the respirator is occasionally necessary to prolong his life. The fact
that Robert only occasionally needs respiratory support indicates that his
lungs are not irreversibly damaged. He may grow out of his periods of
apnea and bradycardia. Is use of the respirator "medically contraindicated"? No. It is true that the respirator may have impaired Robert's
lungs, but this is common and recovery is quite possible. The alternative to
use of a respirator now is a quick death by asphyxiation. If we were to
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decide not to resuscitate Robert should he once again develop apnea ,
would this be based on the fact that Robert is handicapped? [t must be. Use
of the respirator is standard practice in N[CU's. Only his poor prognosis
for mental normalcy and the difficulties his care is likely to encounter at
home, not any terminal illness , explain why anyone would think twice
about withholding treatment. Thus, it appears inescapable that, according
to the Reagan adm ini stration guidelines, not returning Robert to the
respirator would be a violation of Section 504.
Bu are we morally obliged to re-institute respirator therapy? A case can
be made for a negative answer, one consistent with Church teaching. First
of all, we need not and should not maintain that Robert's life is not worth
living. We would simply say that we had already done enough for Robert,
more than could be demanded by justice. The prospect for significant
benefit to Robert is slim. The burdens already assumed by the provision of
care are large, to say nothing of the suffering to which we have subjected
Robert. The ratio of expected benefit (Robert's) to cost (both for Robert
and others) is too small for treatment to be required in justice. To deny
legitimacy of considering the proportion of burdens to expected benefits in
the care of defective newborns would be (I) to assign them a special status
possessed by no other human being and (2) at the same time to subject
them to the danger of requiring painful therapies no matter how poor the
prognosis.
Without suggesting that the Church's principles require the nontreatment of Robert, we may still insist that nothing in the Church's
position requires treatment , either. As Pope Pius remarked , life and all
temporal activities are subordinated to spiritual ends. We owe Robert, as
we own any helpless person , the type of care we would think obligatory in
our own case. But since we have no duty to impose excessive burdens on
ourselves or others to preserve our own life, there are limits to what can in
justice be imposed on us for the care of others.
,
The Reagan administration has acted to remedy a serious injustice
occurring in the care of the most helpless among us. Reasonable people
may well disagree on the best way of seeing that justice be done. This paper
has not been concerned to evaluate the workability of the guidelines, but to
examine the defensibility of the underlying principles. It may very well be
the case that in order to assure that injustices like the one in Bloomingon
not occur, the procedures to be implemented must exclude relative qualityof-life assessments or consideration of the burden of care for family and
society. But even if this were true, it is a suggestion that needs argument
and should not be assumed at the outset. Also , it is one thing to say that
certain morally acceptable principles cannot be applied in a given context
because of their unworkability or danger of abuse. It is quite another to
maintain that those principles are themselves improper and that appeal to
them displays a poor sense of justice. This paper has been concerned to
show simply that considerations excluded by the HHS documents are
defensible within a general theory of justice and are consistent with Church
November, 1986
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teaching. The wisdom of their employment within the context of perinatal
medicine ha s not been addressed here.
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